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This paper is an exercise in reflexive theoretical sociology which marks a shift in my 
approach to the sociology of human rights. It begins by critically examining my past 
practice in the light of the general criticisms of the sociology of law recently set out by 
Mariana Valverde. My conclusion is that, while Valverde’s particular criticisms, as 
mediated through Christopher Tomlins’ discussion of my work, have little force, the radical 
nature of her challenge has the considerable merit of forcing the recognition and 
clarification of other very significant problems with my work, notably the absence of a 
distinctively sociological conception of rights. Having filled this gap, the paper goes on to 
provide a formal analytical description of the scope of the sociology of human rights. What 
is distinctive about this description is the fact that it recognizes that sociology should be as 
concerned with the causes of abuse as with the legal and other responses to abuse. The 
paper ends by suggesting that such an approach should greatly enhance the value-added 
provided by sociology to the study of human rights since it promises to provide a means of 
investigating the causes of human rights abuses that looks beyond the guilt or innocence of 
individual perpetrators of abuse.
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I first began to realize that there may be a need to make the sociology of 
human rights more sociological in the course of writing my book Human 
Rights (2005a). On the one hand, I had argued for some time that whether 
one was interested in understanding or enforcing human rights the ‘law was 
not enough,’ but on the other hand most of what I was writing was actually 
rather narrowly concerned with human rights law or those non-legal 
developments that most directly affected the course of rights discourse. 
Fortunately for me, I was able to stop the anxiety produced by the resulting 
discomfort from becoming a block by inserting a chapter in Human Rights 
on what I called the comparative sociology of human rights and suggesting 
that interested readers should look at my earlier case studies (Woodiwiss, 
1990b, 1992, 1998, 2003), if they wanted to know exactly how the general 
social processes specified in the chapter affected the development of labour 
rights in the particular societies I was discussing. 
Fine though I hope it is in its own terms, the comparative sociology 
chapter was undoubtedly something of a bandaid. However, it is true that in 
my original case studies there is a lot about the pertinent non-legal and 
indeed wider legal aspects of social life and their role not just in directly 
prompting human rights developments but also in producing the underlying 
problems that the rights involved were a response to. Nevertheless, looking 
back, I can now see that if the source of the strength of my case studies lay in 
their rather tight focus on labour rights, this same tight focus was also a 
major source of the frustration I experienced when it came to trying to 
transfer the insights I felt I had gained from the labour rights case studies to 
the broader phenomena that are human rights. The principal symptom of my 
frustration was my inability at the time I was writing Human Rights to 
formulate any sort of general analytical statement as to the nature of the 
relationship between social-structural developments and human rights as a 
whole. Instead I scurried back to the comfortable resting place that for me 
was represented by Durkheim’s insight as to the indexical character of the law 
and resorted to the metaphor of human rights being the tip of a social 
iceberg. 
With the benefit of hindsight and thanks to the comments of a couple of 
perceptive commentators on my work, I can now see that the ultimate source 
of my problem was that I wanted to understand rights as uniform moments 
in a single causal process, whereas I should have been trying to see them as 
differentiated moments in a generic causal process. Further, my continuing 
inability to grasp what that generic process might look like resulted from 
simultaneously taking my analysis of labour rights to be more abstract than it 
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was and failing to think in sufficiently abstract terms about non-labour 
rights. That is, while understanding labour rights, as I do, to be both 
constituted by and constitutive of class relations represented a pretty abstract 
way of thinking about labour rights, this same understanding made it very 
difficult to understand the social-structural and wider legal conditions 
affecting and affected by non-labour rights. This was because as far as I could 
see very few of the latter had any class-structural pertinence at all. In other 
words, although I formally declared my desire to avoid doing such a thing, I 
both continued unconsciously to confuse class relations with social relations 
as a whole, and failed to think structurally about social relations as a whole. 
For this reason, I could see no commonality at all (not even generically) 
between the two categories of rights (labour/non-labour), although I knew 
that it must be there somewhere. Hence, again, the attraction of Durkheim’s 
idea of the law’s indexicality and the iceberg metaphor — only the tip is 
visible while the rest is hidden and so does not have to be displayed, or at 
least not until someone asks to see what is beneath the waterline. The rest of 
the paper, then, is an account of how I got to what I would now say were 
anyone to make such a request. 
The most fundamental problem that all sociologists face when studying 
any legal phenomena is that created by the mutual antipathies between law 
and sociology as academic disciplines. Lawyers, well at least very 
conventional lawyers, tend or have tended to think of the law in a Neo- 
Platonic way as a realm of pure thought disconnected not just from the hurly 
burly of everyday life with its venalities, special pleadings and petty squabbles 
but also from history and the social forces that determine its course. Such 
pretensions have represented a red rag to generations of sociological bulls 
who in one way or another have sought to bring law and lawyers down to 
earth. Unfortunately, the net result of such iconoclasm has too often been 
what some Critical Legal Scholars of the 1980s proudly called the ‘trashing’ of 
the law and, perhaps more importantly, the consequent loss of any sense of 
the distinctive character of the legal realm. 
Taking Nietzsche Seriously? 
In other words, the problem I was struggling with was perhaps rather 
more profound than I had imagined. Certainly this would be the view of 
prominent sociologists of law like Mariana Valverde and Christopher 
Tomlins. Valverde begins her apparently increasingly influential critique of 
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the Sociology of Law with the following quotation from Friedrich Nietszche: 
Legal conditions may be nothing more than exceptional states of emergency 
… A state of law conceived as sovereign and general, not as a means in the 
struggle between power-complexes, but as a means against struggle itself … 
would be a principle hostile to life, would represent the destruction and 
dissolution of man, an attack on the future of man, a sign of exhaustion, a 
secret path towards nothingness (Nietzsche (1887) 1996, p. 57; quoted in 
Valverde [2006, p. 591]). 
Valverde’s claim is that Sociology’s interest in looking at the relations between 
the legal and other spheres of life discloses a commitment to just that 
conception of law as a distinct, ‘sovereign and general’ sphere of social 
relations that Nietszche identifies as anti-life. She continues: 
Sociology is full of static models of motion? or more accurately, static 
models of that very special, evolutionist form of motion that is called ‘social 
change’ … [By contrast] my key interest is experimenting with concepts that 
are themselves dynamic, rather than working with concepts that, like 
cameras, are designed to ‘capture’ flows and struggles by means of static 
photographs or static X-rays. We can at least try to think about knowledge 
production and use without positing ‘laws of motion,’ trying instead to 
document actually existing ‘translations’ (Latour 1987) and other moves 
made in the knowledge game. The moves can be mapped and to some 
extent inventorized in analyses that avoid positing social ontologies and 
therefore avoid positing any ‘boundaries,’ and that instead highlight the 
creativity of both human and nonhuman actors (cf. Latour 2002) and the 
contingency of all legal situations (Valverde 2006, p. 592; see also Tomlins 
[2007, p. 61-67]). 
It is of course a surprise to hear an avowed Foucaultian so enthusiastically 
speaking up for creative individualism and against social ontologies and one 
wonders where this leaves the category of discourse for example. Also, it 
should be noted that the quote from Nietzsche with which Valverde begins 
her article provides no support whatsoever for the argument that she derives 
from it.1 This said, I would nevertheless like to begin my argument by taking 
1 Unfortunately, Valverde seems to have been misled by the modish style of the translation she 
uses which to my mind tries a little too hard to give Nietzsche’s text a contemporary feel. Older 
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Valverde seriously since doing so will require me to revisit some of the most 
basic propositions of the Sociology of Law and check their cogency which 
seems a sensible thing to do when embarking on a new venture since there is 
little point in building castles on sand. Thus I will begin the positive part of 
the paper by indicating what sort of account of the development of human 
rights would be produced by using the ‘dynamic methods’ that Valverde 
commends and which some other Foucaultian scholars have summarized as 
follows: 
[the description of the] multitude of ways of dividing and managing a 
territory and its inhabitants including not only humans, but animals, motor 
cars, mechanical and electrical devices, transport networks, flows of energy 
and the like in the process of governing it as a society (Osborne, Rose, and 
Savage 2008, p. 531). 
In other words, human rights discourse would be represented as a collection 
of administrative texts, and the methods used to produce and apply them — 
that is, as texts all the way down. 
In some ways this is actually fine by me as is, given the recent dominance 
of Sociology by a fact free theoreticism a la Giddens, the assertive empiricism 
Valverde uses to justify her proposed method. Moreover, the Foucaultian 
governmentality school to which Valverde belongs has already produced 
some excellent templates for such studies like Nikolas Rose’s Power of 
Freedom (1999). In my view it would, however, be a great shame if the 
analytical possibilities created by the more detailed knowledge of the ‘hows’ 
of social change produced by such as Rose were not taken advantage of in the 
pursuit of knowledge of the ‘whys’ of interest to more conventional 
sociologists because of a self-denying ordinance that was rooted in a 
misconception as to the nature of what such analytical possibilities might be. 
Troublingly, or perhaps I should say thankfully, there does seem to be 
translations render the italicised section and its immediate context thus: ‘from the biological point 
of view legal conditions are necessarily exceptional conditions since they limit the radical life-will 
bent on power.’ (Nietzsche 1956, p. 208) Despite the implications Valverde draws from her 
translation’s use of ‘states of emergency’ in the same passage, the point Nietzsche is making is in no 
way the same as that which Schmidt (1932) and Agamban (2005) have in mind when they speak 
of ‘states of emergency’ or ‘states of exception.’ Rather what Nietzsche is objecting to is conceptions 
of law that do not regard it ‘merely as an instrument in the struggle of power complexes.’ In other 
words, he is espousing an understanding of the role of law that seems very similar to that of what 
today we would call ‘vulgar Marxism,’ except that in his case it would seem to have been part of an 
even more vulgar biological evolutionism.
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evidence of just such a misconception in the writings of this group. For 
example, Osborne et al. state that their aim is to produce a ‘sociology which is 
happy to remain on the surface … without reducing that superficial array to 
the status of derivatives of more fundamental laws’ (Osborne et al. 2008, p. 
530). As far as I know the only sociologists who continue to talk of 
‘fundamental laws of motion’ are a tiny number of marginal Marxists who 
retain a belief in the positivist version of Marxism associated with the 
nineteenth-century Second International. 
Another example of Osborne et al’s misconception of what the analytical 
possibilities might be is provided when they state that: the fragmentation of 
the idea of the nation state requires us to also recognize the social, moral, 
technical practices by which it was assembled in the first place … [and] it was 
never, in fact, a question of adhering to this or that concept of society but of 
inventing forms of visualization and inscription, of thinking with hands, eyes 
and ears, to render and manipulate phenomena into a social form and 
organizing them in the frame of ‘society’ (Osborne et al. 2008, p. 531). 
Again I know of no sociologists who would today argue that the shaping 
of, for example, capitalist societies is a product of any sort of conscious 
overall design effort inspired by a concept of what their shape, so to speak, 
should be. In the 1960s there were, of course, some instrumentalist Marxists, 
like Ralph Miliband in his The State in Capitalist Society for example, who 
argued in this way, but the arrival of structuralism sharply reduced the 
influence of such ways of thinking. 
Although Osborne et al do not cite Valverde’s paper with approval or 
otherwise, it is clear from their stress on the importance of describing 
surfaces and their dismissal of any idea of social life having any depth that 
they share her distaste for boundaries other than very strictly nominalistic 
ones and therefore for any idea that there might be an outside to law or 
indeed to any other particular region of the social. To my mind, what this 
must mean is that they and Valverde either think that the law or whatever is 
self-constituting and self-enforcing or that such processes simply cannot be 
understood. Fortunately, there is no need for the rest of us to share either 
their delusion or their despair. Most sociologists these days are neither 
positivistic economic determinists nor rationalistic instrumentalists but what 
I term ‘ordinary realists’ (Woodiwiss 2005b) who organize their research not 
on the basis of any supposed laws or intentions but on the basis of explicit or 
implicit and always fallible theoretico-empirical models constructed on the 
basis of the discipline’s ongoing theoretical and research efforts. Generally, 
the authors of these models are thoroughly aware that the elements of actual 
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social structure’s are much more closely intertwined with and permeable to 
one another than is sometimes suggested by their models. 
Finally, if one has had a sociological education, which many of the 
Governmentality School have not, it really is just not that difficult to see that 
the sets of social relations that produce, for example, legislatures, courts and 
the discourses that emanate from them as different from those sets of social 
relations that produce the sites where these discourses are applied or 
consumed and have to be reconciled (or not) with pre-existing discourses. 
Given this, it also does not seem to be at all disastrous if for analytical 
purposes one regards each set of these relations as external to one another. By 
contrast, what does seem to me to be absolutely disastrous is to conclude, as 
Valverde et al appear to, that since there is no outside there must only be one 
inside, namely that of the world- creating text. 
Sociologists Taking Rights Seriously 
Moreover and again contrary to what Valverde et al appear to believe, 
there have in fact been many notable exceptions to the alleged rule that, even 
if they only do so for analytical purposes, sociologists who talk as if the legal 
and the social exist in some sense externally to one another always end up 
denigrating the law as a meaningful area of endeavor and therefore an 
effective social force. Among these exceptions are two of the sociological 
greats, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. Classical sociology contained not 
just a keen appreciation of the limited nature of the social amelioration made 
possible by the development of rights, but also most of the elements 
necessary to create a sophisticated sociology of human rights that is not prey 
to Valverde’s criticisms. 
Thus none of the classical theorists, not even Marx, ‘trashed’ either rights 
or the law in general. On the contrary, the development of rights discourse 
was regarded by each of them as an highly significant aspect of the great 
transformations that were their principal objects of study. Indeed, each of 
them regarded rights as having positively shaped the course and outcomes of 
these transformations (for Marx rights played a positive role in facilitating the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism but threatened to obstruct the 
transition from capitalism to socialism because of the way in which they 
entrenched egotism). I have written at length elsewhere (Woodiwiss 1990, 
2003, 2005a) about the classical theorists’ contributions to the conceptual 
architecture of a sociology of human rights and it would not be appropriate to 
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attempt any sort of summary here. What I will do instead is simply draw your 
attention to a couple of quotations that are particularly germane in the 
present context. The first is from Max Weber: 
Rigorously formalistic and dependent on what is tangibly perceivable as far 
as it is required for security to do business, the law has at the same time 
become informal for the sake of business good-will where this is required … 
[and] interpreted as some ‘ethical minimum’. The law is drawn into anti-
formal directions, moreover, by all those powers which demand that it be 
more than a mere means of pacifying conflicts of interest. These forces 
include the demand for substantive justice by certain social class interests 
and ideologies; they also include the tendencies inherent in certain forms of 
political authority of either democratic or authoritarian character 
concerning the ends of law … finally … anti-formal tendencies are being 
promoted by the ideologically rooted power aspirations of the legal 
profession itself … [Nevertheless] the notion must expand that the law is a 
rational technical apparatus, which is continually transformable in the light 
of expediental considerations and devoid of all sacredness of content … All 
of the modern sociological and philosophical analyses … can only 
contribute to strengthen this impression (Weber 1922, pp. 894-95). 
The second is from Durkheim and in it he anticipates by some 80 or so years 
many of the insights contained within Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’: 
[The political economists] have, however, been mistaken as to the nature of 
this liberty. Since they see it as a constitutive attribute of man, since they 
logically deduce it from the concept of the individual in itself, it seems to 
them to be entirely a state of nature, leaving aside all of society. Social action, 
according to them, has nothing to add to it; all that it can and must do is to 
regulate the external functioning in such a way that the competing liberties 
do not harm one another. And, if it is not strictly confined within these 
limits, it encroaches on the legitimate domain of the individual and 
diminishes it. But, besides the fact that it is false to believe that all regulation 
is the product of constraint, it happens that liberty itself is the product of 
regulation. Far from being antagonistic to social action, it results from social 
action. It is far from being an inherent property of the state of nature. On 
the contrary, it is a conquest of society over nature (Durkheim 1893, pp. 
386-87). 
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In the first extract, Weber, on the one hand, confirms Marx’s judgement that 
in the end, and as defined by the clash of class and political forces, rights exist 
in order to provide the ‘security to do business’ and, on the other hand, he 
acknowledges far more directly than Marx did that rights may also provide a 
means of securing what he terms an ‘ethical minimum’ in the conduct of such 
business. In the second extract, Durkheim may be read as developing these 
points by explaining that the market-critical concept of ‘liberty’ or freedom is 
a social product rather than a god-given benefit which means that it has no 
essential content and may therefore be further shaped and reshaped (that is, 
regulated) by ‘social action’. 
Lawyers Taking Sociology Seriously 
There have also, of course, been exceptions to the equally well-
established rule on the legal side that ‘trashing’ is all you can expect from 
sociology. And again these exceptions are among the jurisprudential greats 
including the American Legal Realists. The only one I will mention here is 
the Oxford legal philosopher Herbert Hart, who was just as insistent on the 
analytical utility of separating the legal from the social as any sociologist. 
In the United States and Britain for the past thirty of so years the 
intellectually most influential Neo-Platonist legal text has been Ronald 
Dworkin’s Taking Rights Seriously (1977). But prior to the appearance of 
Dworkin’s book, and still today for many of those who have not fallen under 
Dworkin’s spell, the most influential theory of law was or remains the 
restatement of what is known as Legal Positivism set out in Hart’s The 
Concept of Law (1961). According to the Legal Positivists whom it should be 
said are by no means always also Logical Positivists, individuals only have 
rights insofar as such rights have been created by positive (that is, explicit) 
and legitimate legal or political actions. Any suggestion that there might be 
rights that are naturally or morally inherent in human beings is, to use the 
famous words so often taken from Jeremy Bentham’s Anarchical Fallacies, 
‘nonsense upon stilts.’ This is the view that, as his title suggests, Dworkin 
challenged. His counter argument was that, in one way or another and so far 
from promoting anarchy, those rights that are termed ‘natural’ or ‘human’ 
and the morality they consequently carry into legal reasoning impart not just 
ethical significance but also an essential intellectual coherence to legal 
systems and indeed societies. According to Dworkin the unlegislated moral 
principle that provides this coherence is the idea that society owes all its 
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members a certain ‘equality of concern and respect’ (cp. ‘dignity’ in human 
rights discourse). However, for Hart the separation of law from morality was 
important not simply because it made it easier to demarcate the basic 
lineaments of the legal but also precisely because it preserved the idea that 
morality ‘is something outside the official system, by reference to which in 
the last resort the individual must solve his problems of obedience’ (ibid., p. 
206). By keeping law and morality separate from one another, Hart sought to 
preserve an autonomy for the moral sphere that would allow both the 
distinguishing of certain legal rights as natural rights and the possibility of 
criticizing this idea and the content of any particular effort to specify the 
rights that should be afforded this status. 
In contrast, what Dworkin meant by ‘taking rights seriously', given that 
his principle of ’equality of concern and respect’ was derived from his 
reflections on the ’original position’ set out in John Rawls’ Theory of Justice, 
was that liberalism was a universal ethical necessity in the sphere of 
governance and one moreover that legitimated many of the less capital-
threatening aspects of the socialist approach to social development (for an 
highly influential example of the role of the work of Rawls and Dworkin in 
the making of contemporary Neo-Platonism in the human rights sphere, see 
Donnelly [2003, p. 44ff]). Also, because his text revived philosophical interest 
in rights by presenting itself as a critique of Hart, Dworkin’s intervention 
greatly reduced the likelihood that much interest might be shown in 
developing the approach to the study of legal phenomena such as rights that 
Hart had pointed towards when he wrote in the preface to The Concept of 
Law, that the book could be read as ‘an essay in descriptive sociology.’ From 
my particular sociological viewpoint this was especially regrettable since, 
despite his unpromising formal commitment to Peter Winch’s (1958) far 
from epistemologically positivist variant of social constructionism, Hart’s 
sociology was far from simply descriptive, animated as it was by the following 
‘sobering truth’: 
the step from the simple form of society, where primary rules of obligation 
are the only means of social control, into the legal world with its centrally 
organized legislature, courts, officials, and sanctions brings its solid gains at 
a certain cost. The gains are those of adaptability to change, certainty, and 
efficiency, and these are immense; the cost is the risk that the centrally 
organized power may well be used for the oppression of numbers of those 
with whose support it can dispense, in a way that the simpler regime of 
primary rules could not (Hart 1961, pp. 197-98). 
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In other words, whereas Dworkin assumes that certain rights are the inherent 
property of all human beings and unproblematically serve to protect them 
against the abuse of power, Hart acknowledges that the law and therefore 
rights too exist in a world where power is unequally distributed and he 
therefore allows the possibility that rights might embody and so be complicit 
with this inequality to the degree that it may even be that some individuals 
have no rights at all. By developing his Legal Positivist concept of law, then, 
Hart appears to have hoped to separate the law from liberal morality in 
particular in order to preserve not only the possibility of other moralities but 
also the concepts of law and rights too for articulation with such other 
moralities. In Hart’s own case his preferred morality was markedly, and to me 
surprisingly, socialistic in character. In sum, then, and regardless of its 
disciplinary source, the preference for thinking of the law and the social as 
analytically separable spheres of social life by no means necessarily results in 
the ‘trashing’ of the law. On the contrary, when acted on with the skill and 
sophistication of a Weber, a Durkheim, or a Hart, this is a preference that has 
proved highly effective in enhancing our knowledge of the law. 
Taking Myself Seriously 
Now, of course the reason I have spoken about Weber, Durkheim and 
Hart is because, alongside Foucault, they are the thinkers I have drawn upon 
as I have tried to work myself away from the Marxist (n.b. not Marx’s) mode 
of trashing the law without losing sight of Marx’s great insight as to the 
inherently social character of the law. Humblingly, it has only been since I 
have been able to see the pertinent parts of my work through the eyes of 
others that I have been able to appreciate fully what its contribution might be. 
In a paper published a couple of years ago, Tomlins correctly and 
appropriately in the current context identifies my theoretical work as a 
contribution to the debate concerning the autonomy or otherwise of the law. 
His excellent summary of my conceptualization of the law is as follows: 
Starting from Marxist theory’s convergence upon relative autonomy … 
Woodiwiss attempted a further and more rigorous specification of 
autonomy’s relativity at any given moment by turning to Foucault. Relative 
autonomy, he argued, inhered not in the structural relationship between law 
and society but in the particularities of legal discourse. For Woodiwiss, what 
was law at any given moment was determined by legal discourse’s own rules 
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of formation. Law’s relationship to economy, as to any social process, was 
hence decisively mediated by the particularities and anomalies of its own 
process of creation. Intrinsic to that process and the basis of law’s autonomy, 
Woodiwiss (1990a, p. 10) argued, was a foundational and constitutive 
impulse to “consistency.” Consistency was legal discourse’s guiding sign, it 
was “the prime discursively produced object of law” (Woodiwiss 1985, p. 
68). It was the foundation upon which was built law’s potent “background 
ideology-effect” of legitimation in relation to the social formation of which it 
is part. Precisely to enjoy social authority as a modality of rule, however, 
legal discourse had also to remain consistent with “the principles structuring 
the dominant or hegemonic discourses” abroad in society at large This was 
“the most important criterion against which its consistency is judged’ 
(Woodiwiss 1990a, p. 11). Here that is lay the relativity of law’s autonomy. 
Understanding law as a compound of discourses and their practices, 
Woodiwiss argued, enabled one to investigate with some precision how law 
produces its effects, both foreground (specific outcomes) and background 
(ideology). Recalling Poulantzas, law “interpellates the subjects it addresses in 
such a way that they will be law- abiding” (Subject positions “are constituted 
by the rights and duties that define them and therefore determine the 
relations that can or should exist between them”? husband/wife, employer/
employee, and so forth. Subject positions are also simultaneously and 
independently constituted in other discourses with which law seeks 
consistency, but which may also interpellate subjects differently. When 
disciplinary equilibria achieved in one discourse, or among discourses, break 
down, they become the object of reinforcement in others. In law, 
reinforcement is performed by transpositioning changing the position of the 
subject (from wife to civil respondent, for example; from employee to 
criminal defendant potentially effecting “a transformation of rights, duties 
and therefore relations” (Woodiwiss 1985, p. 73). As a medium of 
transpositioning, law enjoys autonomy its transpositional capacities are not 
exercised functionally, according to the needs of capital, but according to the 
dictates of its own intrinsic technology as a discourse (its particular tactics, its 
power effects); nor is law necessarily the transpositioning discourse: one can 
imagine many other discourses with transpositional capacities. However, 
“conditions appropriate to the securing of capitalist production and exchange 
may strongly suggest an affinity with legalistic forms” (Woodiwiss 1985, p. 
73). Moreover, in that affinity lies an ultimate (and restated) relationality. “In 
the same way that a particular legal system as an ideological and political 
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element represents a condition of the existence of the economy, then so too 
economic, as well as other political and ideological elements represent the 
conditions of existence of the legal system. For this reason one has to look 
beyond the law if one wishes to understand fully such juridical signifiers as 
constitutions, statutes, juristic arguments, and such disciplinary effects as 
decisions to proceed or not, degrees of enforcement and even judgments 
themselves” (Woodiwiss 1985, p. 75; see also Woodiwiss [1990b, p. 120]; on 
transpositioning, see also Hunt [1992, p. 31]). 
Accurate though this summary is, and I feel distinctly churlish saying 
this since, as I have already indicated, I have learnt a lot from Tomlins’ 
discussion of my work, it is seriously incomplete as regards what to me at the 
time of writing was one of my most important achievements, namely my 
recognition of at least something of the complexity of the social/legal 
interface. Tomlins does not neglect all of what I say on this issue since he 
generously makes the point that, formally at least, I do not regard class 
relations as exhaustive or even necessarily an at all pertinent aspect of the 
social insofar as it affects and is effected by the law. However, he neglects four 
further points. The first is that the passage that he quotes about the law 
interpellating ‘the subjects it addresses in such a way that they will be law-
abiding,’ continues in the following way that he does not quote: ‘provided that 
such subjects do not successfully resist this disciplining because of prior or 
other interpellations produced by counter discourses’ (Woodiwiss 1990a, p. 
115). The significance of my continuing in this way is that, contra Valverde 
but as is also the case with most other sociological formulations of the law/
society relation, including those produced by contemporary Marxists as 
indeed Tomlins himself makes so brilliantly clear, there is no way that my 
understanding of the law can be represented as anything other than as the 
‘means in the struggle between power-complexes’ that Nietzsche says it is. 
Tomlins’ second omission relates to my recognition that the 
transpositioning that for me is law’s raison d’etre takes a wide variety of forms 
which is what one would expect given the diversity of contexts within which 
rights play a role: 
In other words, and in the end rather obviously to any kind of conventional 
sociologist, the only way to begin to uncover the variety of legal relations is 
by thinking of the law and the remainder of the social as external to one 
another and noting the many different tasks that the law is asked to perform 
(Woodiwiss 1990a, p. 117). 
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Tomlins’ third omission concerns my conception of the law as necessarily 
‘intermittently operative’ with respect to individuals, which is to say that: 
(Woodiwiss 1990a, p. 119). Three points may be made on the basis of this 
extract. First, ‘intermittently operative’ is a less dramatic way of saying the 
same thing as Nietzsche when he talks of ‘states of emergency.’ Second, the 
idea of law as ‘intermittently operative’ has long been central to social-
scientific thought about the law. See for example the characterization by Otto 
Kahn-Freund (a judge in the Weimar Labour Court and the doyen of British 
labour lawyers in the 1960s) of the law as a ‘secondary force in human affairs 
… [since] … it can only effectively intervene in human affairs if what is 
socially desired is not being otherwise obtained, if the existing arrangements 
between “social powers” are insufficient, or if nationally specific reasons 
require it’ (Woodiwiss 1990a, pp. 93-94). And third, for sociologists law’s 
‘intermittent operation’ has long been one of the key factors explaining why 
the entwining of the Law with other sets of social relations such as those 
pertaining to the state is a real necessity rather than an artifact of any 
analytical error consequent on trying to look beneath the social surface.
All that said, the foregoing simply establishes that my theorization of the 
law as a transpositioning mechanism avoids all of Valverde’s criticisms and 
this is because it remains consistent with what might be termed the three 
practical research verities of the Sociology of Law: If you want to understand 
legal institutions or almost any other institutions for that matter, and even 
when they are as socially insulated and as constrained as are those associated 
with the law, it is a good idea to begin by assuming that they are subject to all 
kinds of cross-cutting pressures and are therefore inevitably locations of 
conflict with the result that there must always be uncertainty as to the 
ultimate significance of what goes on within them. 
If you want to find out how the law like anything else works, you have to 
open the box, lift out what you find inside and take it apart. The trick is to 
find the key. 
If you want to understand why there are not even more judges, lawyers 
and policemen than there are already, you have to realize that this is because 
societies are basically self-regulating so therefore continuous legal 
intervention is not necessary and ‘intermittent operation’ is generally 
sufficient to deal with any failures of self-regulation. 
Tomlins’ fourth and most important omission is, however, one that I 
have to admit is far more understandable than those listed so far since it 
concerns an element that was added to transpositioning theory long after the 
main body of the theory had been set out. That is, some eight years after the 
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publication of the books that Tomlins discusses, I realized that something 
was missing. This was any account of what were the means as opposed to the 
manner whereby the legal and the social were connected. And I also have to 
admit that I came to this realization and filled the gap that it represented not 
in a logical fashion by first identifying a gap and then filling it but 
serendipitously by finally finding the intellectual courage to try to provide a 
sociological specification of a right (Woodiwiss 1998, pp. 47-48). In doing 
this I, first, followed Paul Hirst (1979, p. 104) in rejecting the idea of natural 
rights and replacing it with the much more mundane conception of rights as 
discursive entities that serve ‘certain socially determined policy objectives 
and interests.’ Second, I recognized with William MacNeil (1992, 1995) that 
to view rights as separately existing discursive entities rather than things that 
were somehow inherently part of individual human beings immediately 
foregrounds the question as to whether and how such discursive entities are 
actually connected or attached to the agents, human or otherwise, that are 
their supposed bearers. Third, I followed Wesley Hohfeld (1921) in 
understanding that these entities can take the form of either a liberty, a claim, 
a power or an immunity depending on the nature of the particular legal 
culture. In sum, then, and regardless of whether it is a human or a plain right, 
a right may be understood sociologically as a discursive entitity that can take 
the form of either a liberty, a claim, a power or an immunity and whose 
attachment or otherwise to individuals is socially determined. 
I made the point earlier that, if you want to open any box you have first 
to find the key. And it turned out that the key to opening the black box that 
the law is for most of us lay not simply in understanding rights as core 
elements in the internal life of the law but also in understanding them to 
represent precisely the means through which the law and the social are 
connected and which therefore make it possible for the law to play its 
transpositioning role. In other words, the critical insight that dissolves the 
mystery of the law continues to be that which Marx expressed when he said 
in Capital 1 what Evgeny Pashukanis’ renders as, ‘Commodities cannot 
themselves go to market and perform exchange in their own right. We must 
therefore have recourse to their guardians, who are the possessors of 
commodities’ (Pashukanis 1978, p. 112). And all that is necessary to extend 
this insight so that the rather different role of rights in non-commodity 
exchanges is similarly illuminated is to restate and paraphrase Marx’s little 
scenario thus: ‘guardians (that is, people) cannot be exchanged so we must 
have recourse to their rights which can be.’ 
In sum, then, I would now specify the generic causal process in which 
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rights of whatever kind are critical moments as follows; first, it is a process in 
which failures of actors, whether human or non-human, or indeed and most 
excitingly, to follow Johan Galtung (1994, p. 143), structures of social 
relations to live up to whatever might be the prevailing expectations as 
regards decent behaviour or treatment lead to the legislating of rights written 
(depending on the nature of the failure and the wider social context) either as 
liberties, immunities, powers or claims; second, the result of such legislation 
is that the population is made subject (again as appropriate) to one or other 
mode of legal transpositioning, and therefore at risk of repositioning (for 
example by being put on probation, required to do community service or 
whatever) or depositioning (for example by being imprisioned) in the hope 
that such transpositionings or the fear of them will prevent the initiating 
failures from recurring. 
Taking Religion Seriously 
In a recent review of my Human Rights Gert Verschraegen (2009) 
comments that the author ‘establishes an analogical link between human 
rights and human sacrifice … [but] … does not elaborate upon it in the rest 
of [the book].’ Of course when I first read this criticism I bristled as one does 
when one has been found out and recalled my guiltily pre-prepared response 
to any such charge. This response was that I had used the observation as to 
the almost universal practice of human sacrifice as a counter-metaphor to 
that of the social contract because the figure of human sacrifice sensitizes one 
to the double-sidedness of the history of rights. And what I meant by double- 
sidedness was that for every benefit granted by the passage of a piece of rights 
legislation not only had blood often have to have been spilt but something 
else had been taken away, given up, or lost. All this is true but, as explained 
earlier, what is also true is that my analysis had remained metaphorical and 
implicit because I was not able to do anything else. Even today I have still not 
actually provided an analysis that substitutes the sociological for the 
metaphorical and therefore the explicit for the implicit for any rights apart 
from those pertaining to labour. The difference is that I now think I know 
how such an analysis should be carried out. 
Just as I owe my understanding of the significance of human sacrifice 
and my understanding of law as an index that discloses certain otherwise 
invisible social relations to Durkheim and his school, so I also owe my new 
analytical confidence to further reflection on the work of this school. In my 
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Globalization, Human Rights and Labour Law in Pacific Asia (1998), I used 
Marcel Mauss’s analysis of the gift relationship and his concept of the ‘total 
social fact’ alongside Weber’s ideal type of patriarchalist domination in order 
to establish the possibility that there might be something ‘good’ and therefore 
supportive of respect for human rights in contemporary Pacific-Asian 
discourses of rule. Because my analysis was driven by this purpose, I ended 
up understanding the ‘total social fact’ in entirely positive terms and therefore 
as some sort of repository of ‘goodness’ in human social life. I now 
understand that this was, almost literally, a one-sided conclusion. And this is 
thanks to reading an essay by one of Durkheim’s lesser-known but most long-
lived students, Robert Hertz. The essay concerned is entitled The Pre-
Eminence of the Right Hand: a Study in Religious Polarity (1909) and the 
analytical clues it contains are summarized in the following passage: 
The impure is separated from the sacred and placed at the opposite pole of 
the religious universe. On the other hand, from this point of view the 
profane is no longer defined by purely negative features: it appears as the 
antagonistic element which by its very contact degrades, diminishes, and 
changes the the essence of things that are sacred. It is a nothingness, as it 
were, but an active and contagious nothingness … There is an imperceptible 
transition between the lack of sacred powers and the possession of sinister 
powers. Thus is the classification which has dominated religious 
consciousness from the beginning and in increasing measure there is a 
natural affinity and almost an equivalence between the profane and the 
impure. The two notions are combined and, in opposition to the sacred, 
form the negative pole of the spiritual universe. 
Dualism, which is of the essence of primitive thought, dominates primitive 
social organization. The two moieties or phratries which constitute the tribe 
are reciprocally opposed as sacred and profane. Everything that exists within 
my own phratry is sacred and forbidden to me: this is why I cannot eat my 
totem, or spill the blood of a member of my phratry, or even touch his corpse, 
or marry in my clan. Contrarily, the opposite moiety is profane to me: the 
clans which compose it supply me with provisions, wives, and human 
sacrificial victims, bury my dead, and prepare my sacred ceremonies. Given 
the religious character with which the primitive community feels itself 
invested, the existence of an opposed and complementary section of the same 
tribe, which can freely carry out functions which are forbidden to members 
of the first group, is a necessary condition of social life. The evolution of 
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society replaces this reversible dualism with a rigid hierarchical structure; 
instead of separate and equivalent clans there appear classes or castes, of 
which one, at the summit, is essentially sacred, noble and devoted to superior 
works, while another at the bottom, is profane or unclean and engaged in 
base tasks … 
The whole universe is divided into two contrasted spheres … Powers 
which maintain and increase life, which give health, social pre-eminence, 
courage in war and skill in work all reside in the sacred principle. Contrarily, 
the profane and the impure are essentially weakening and deadly: the baleful 
influences that oppress, diminish and harm individuals come from this side. 
So on one side there is the pole of strength, good and life; while on the other 
there is the pole of weakness, evil and death. Or, if a more recent terminology 
is preferred, on the one side gods, on the other side demons (Hertz 1909, pp. 
95-6). On my reading, what Hertz does in this remarkable passage is to 
demonstrate once again the power of Durkheim’s insight as to the fact that 
collective representations, in this case the ideas of good and evil that are 
central to human rights discourse, have both their origins and sources of 
sustenance in social conditions and especially the collective rituals that seek 
to propitiate the evil as well as celebrate the benign spirits. In this case, these 
conditions are those that secure the existence of clans and early states. The 
‘good’ may therefore be understood as everything that supports the existence 
of such clans and states, while the ‘evil’ may be understood as everything that 
threatens this existence. And, truer to the Durkheimian tradition than I had 
been, for Hertz the differentiation of the two sets of conditions of existence 
leads not to a utopian fantasy as to the possibility of a purely good society but 
to a recognition of the unavoidable coexistence of good and evil. 
I do not know if everyone will agree, but I think that it would be true to 
say of the general and more theoretical Sociology of Human Rights literature 
we know and indeed have produced that it focuses much more on trying to 
explain the good than the evil. Notable exceptions would be Bryan Turner’s 
identification of the shared recognition of ‘human vulnerability’ as the key 
element allowing or supporting the universalization of human rights 
discourse, and Stan Cohen’s study of the role of denial in accounting for our 
continuing toleration of human rights abuses. Of course there are huge legal, 
political, historical and indeed sociological literatures relating to human 
rights abuses and the conditions that produce them, but for some reason we 
rarely try to theorize the data provided in these literatures. The one exception 
to this rule that I know of is Darren O’Byrne’s (2003) version of the book 
called Human Rights. Disappointingly, while O’Byrne’s text points in the 
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right direction it does little more than just point since, not only is it 
completely unsociological in its approach to understanding the genealogy of 
human rights discourse but it also does not so much develop a sociology of 
human rights abuse as invoke the possible relevance of isolated concepts such 
as Louis Althusser’s ‘repressive state apparatuses’ to understanding why and 
how abuses occur. In the end, though, the very weaknesses of O’Byrne’s study 
make it a valuably suggestive work since, while a single Althusserian concept 
does not represent a theory of human rights abuse, thanks to O’Byrne it is 
now much easier to see than it was that Althusser’s or indeed Habermas’ 
theories as wholes could provide theories of human rights abuse and indeed 
its mitigation. 
For my own part though, it seems to me that Durkheim and his School 
occupy pole position when it comes to the race to provide a sociological 
account of human rights abuses since their prime object of study from the 
beginning was morality with the result that their whole conceptual system is 
already pointing in the right direction, so to speak. In the societies that 
Durkheim and Hertz studied the forces behind good and evil were 
understood in cosmological terms as gods and demons respectively. Even 
today many people continue to share this cosmological understanding. 
However, of course and almost by definition, sociologists cannot share such 
an understanding but must regard it as a metaphor that it is their task to 
replace with a properly scientific account (Lopez 2003). And to do this with 
regard to the human rights of individuals, and whether one is concerned with 
historical or contemporary situations, one must shift the object of study from 
the conditions that are positive and negative for the survival of whole 
societies to those that are positive and negative for groups and individuals in 
particular societies. That is, one must look for the pertinent equivalents of the 
‘suicidogenic currents’ that, according to Durkheim, explain why societies 
exhibit distinctive levels and varieties of voluntary deaths, and explain them. 
In the case of suicide, the ultimate causes of these currents were the 
conditions making for anomic, altruistic, fatalistic and egoistic suicides. 
In the case of human rights one would be looking for what might be 
termed the social- structurally induced ‘rights-destructive’ and ‘rights-
restorative’ currents that explain both societal abuse and response profiles 
and why they differ with respect to the balance between different kinds of 
abuse (i.e. civil, political, economic, social and cultural etc.), the distribution 
of particular abuses within these categories and the modes and effectivity of 
responses. Put more concretely, on the one hand, one would be trying to 
understand if and why particular groups or individuals were selected for 
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abuse, what form the abuse took and why, as well as, on the other hand, 
trying to establish and explain what protective responses, if any, had been 
mobilized and how effective they had been. More concretely still, with respect 
to groups, one would be carrying out human rights-focused variants of 
existing studies of discrimination and efforts to counter it, while with respect 
to individuals, it strikes me that studies of phenomena like bullying might 
provide a useful, indeed even an archetypal model since there is the shared 
mystery of why particular individuals are ‘picked on’ as targets for abuse. 
In this way, then, we should be able to outline the lineaments of 
contemporary evil and its causes as well as assess the adequacy of any 
counter-measures. And this, then, would be at least one way in which we 
could bring more of the social into the Sociology of Human Rights and so 
increase the value- added of our contribution since the study of these 
currents promises to provide a means of investigating the causes of human 
rights abuses that looks beyond the guilt or innocence of individual 
perpetrators of abuse. 
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